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In loving memory of the late Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Who taught us that laws and precedents
can and should evolve overtime
to better society as a whole,
and discrimination, by any means,
is no longer tolerated.
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how law reform toward gender equity has an impact on
economic growth in Arab countries in the Middle East. Personal status law reform granting
women economic, social, and personal freedoms is spreading across the region and showing
substantial change. Using case studies of major PSL reforms in Tunisia and Morocco, this thesis
outlines qualitative and quantitative evidence to support the case that gender equity benefits the
economic growth of the given country.
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1. Introduction
“When I hear people say a rising tide lifts all boats, I say wait a minute. People are in
different boats – one is going upstream and the other downstream. And the answer is
not about getting people to paddle harder. It’s about putting people in the same river.”
- Dr. Amani Nuru-River

The United Nations 2019 Human Development Report focuses on inequality in all
dimensions of human development. It is titled, “Leaving No One Behind: Towards Inclusive
Citizenship in Arab Countries,” and opens with the UN’s pledge to “help states to achieve all 17
Sustainable Development Goals by the year 2030.” Throughout the growing conflict across the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is expected that, without intervention, 40% of people
in the region will live in crisis and conflict conditions by 2030. The people in this region are at
risk of insecurity, injustice, and violence from any of the following forces of exclusion:
discrimination, geography, governance (ineffective, unactive, or corrupt governance),
socioeconomic status, and shocks and fragility (resilience to disasters: both natural and manmade).1 These forces make it difficult for a person or a people to exercise their rights as citizens.
This paper focuses on only one force of exclusion: Discrimination. Specifically,
discrimination between gender in Arab countries as outlined in FIGURE 1.1.2 While there is
some debate over the definition of “Arab countries,” this thesis will use the term to refer to
countries which primarily speak Arabic and have a shared culture and history. Women in Arab
countries only 85.5 percent of men’s human development gains as measured by the UN Gender
Development Index. Middle East and North African culture clearly distinguishes gender roles

1

Adel Abdellatif, Paola Pagliani, and Ellen Hsu. “Towards Inclusive Citizenship in Arab Countries,” n.d., 48.
“The Arab Human Development Report: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World.” Choice Reviews Online
44, no. 12 (August 1, 2007): 44-6583-44–6583.
2
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and expectations in society, leaving 50% of the population constantly affected by discrimination
because they are women.
FIGURE 1.1 Gender Inequality UNHDP 2019

Gender discrimination is common in Arab countries, specifically regarding citizenship rights: In
only 3 Arab countries can women pass their nationality to their spouse and children, in 7
countries they can pass it to their children but not their spouse, and in the remaining 11 countries
they cannot do either. Arab women have 50% less opportunities than men to have a financial
account. Legislation on domestic violence and paid maternal leave also cause constraints for
women that do not affect men. So if in a country, women are not allowed to formally hold a job
or maintain a bank account, it is plausible that their service and money in the informal market is
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not participating in the national economy and therefore not actively supporting the gross
domestic product.3
Knowing the gender disparities in civil law in many Arab countries, I wonder if this form
of gender inequity has an impact on economic growth. I am analyzing how laws and policies
regarding a citizen’s identity that differ on the basis of sex affect the economic growth of all
citizens in a country, in order to investigate the relationship between gender equity and economic
growth in the Arab World. I hypothesize that a positive shift in gender equity via personal status
reform would influence a positive shift in a nation’s economy:
Personal Status Reform → Gender Equity → Economic Growth
Suppose we select a country with a substantial reform of Personal Status Law toward gender
equity, we would look for a correlating statistically significant change in Gross Domestic
Product per capita. Thus this thesis will work to answer the question: What is the relationship
between personal status law and economic growth in Arab countries in the Middle East and
North Africa?
Chapter 2 analyzes the relationship between civil laws and the economy on a broad scale.
I utilize scholarly arguments to form a foundation of my research of a possible correlation. In
Chapter 3, I establish my argument within existing literature and use theoretical evidence to
support gender equity as a causal mechanism between personal status law and economic growth.
Chapter 4 details the quantitative and qualitative methods by which I intend to investigate my
question as well as why these are the methods of best fit. I also select my case studies for
analysis.

3

Abdellatif, Adel, Paola Pagliani, and Ellen Hsu. “Towards Inclusive Citizenship in Arab Countries,” n.d., 48.
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Chapter 5 investigates existing data on GPDpc over time in my case studies. I use Stata
software to p-test for a statistically significant shift in economic growth. Therefore, in Chapter 6
I analyze these results as well as the PSL reforms in cases that may relate to the possible shifts.
Finally in Chapter 7, I summarize my findings and define the role of my research in the academic
discourse. I also address the limitations of my research and shortcomings in my argument,
methodology, and data.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Economic Impact of Laws
While there is some existing literature on the economic impact of changes in civil laws,
each example has different circumstances that allow for a broader understanding as a literature
review. I was able to take varied cases of law reform and social change to investigate the
common trends in the resulting economic change. There is no perfect formula, but this research
gives a strong baseline for the expected results of my study.
The most recent and expansive research on law and economic growth is, “The Role of
Law in Economic Growth: A Literature Review,” by Guangdong Xu. Xu defines four categories
that can directly impact economic growth: Geography, Trade, Culture, and Institutions. Each of
these can greatly affect, positively or negatively, a country or people’s economic growth, but no
one definitively determines the future alone. Growth will not occur unless individuals are lured
by incentives to undertake social productive activities.4
Xu’s most impactful point is his argument for the importance of the malleability of
institutions, citing the greater capability of common law over civil law to propel economic

4

North, D.C. and Thomas, R.P. (1973) The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
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growth. “The main difference between the two systems is that in common law countries, case
law — in the form of published judicial opinions — is of primary importance, whereas in civil
law systems, codified statutes predominate.”5 Laws and the public’s “buy in” of laws support
economic development and creativity. Common law countries, like the US, protect investors,
shareholders, and creditors. It is thought that common law is an advantage to financial markets
which can stimulate economic growth. Most of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa
practice civil law and do not alter norms overtime through judiciary acts without written
amendments of laws. Xu exemplifies the importance of the law’s ability to affect economic
growth, without directly focusing on one group of people within an economy. This leads to the
ultimate baseline of my research, as common law allows for progress concurrent with change in
social norms, while these Arab countries must wait for a written PSL reform following a societal
change. I draw the conclusion that it is the passing of these PSL that expand women’s equity that
brings about the economic growth, and conversely, the lack of these PSL reforms are invisible
road blocks on their economic ladder.6
BenYishay and Betancourt’s article, “Civil Liberties and Economic Development,”
explores the Freedom House Civil Liberties Index and how it compares and contrasts the
relationship between rights and economic prosperity. They use a conceptual framework of rights
and responsibilities as an essential part of economic success to discuss the “rule of law” as an
influencer to empower “secondary human rights” such as housing, employment, university
education, property rights, geography, and human capital. The authors compare the civil liberties
of freedom and expression of belief, organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy

5

Syam, Piyali. “What Is the Difference Between Common Law and Civil Law?” What is the Difference Between
Common Law and Civil Law? - Blog | @WashULaw, January 28, 2014.
6
Xu, Guangdong. "The role of law in economic growth: a literature review." Journal of Economic Surveys 25, no. 5
(2011): 833-871.
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and individual rights against economic factors such as GDP, difference in income level,
evolution of economic activity, and population.
The end result of the comprehensive study is that all civil liberties are statistically
significant at the same level as the traditional economic indicators on economic growth. The
personal autonomy and individual rights subcategory had the highest t-ratio of any of the other
institutional variables studied, which “evaluates the extent of personal economic freedoms such
as the choice of ownership form, employment, residence and education, as well as social
freedoms such as choice of marriage partners and family size.”7 This high level of statistical
significance shows potential for my proposed research question.
Institutionalism does not seem to corollate to per capita income across the 60 countries
studied, but property rights do corollate regardless of how that indicator is measured. The
measures that performed best in examining economic growth were the secondary human rights
as well as primary right, not civil liberties alone. The authors also looked at geography of
populations, specifically latitude, and they considered whether a country was land locked. This
dimension of data was used to capture access to markets and infrastructure costs. They
considered the malaria ecology index and gross school enrollment ration as an explanatory
variable in the measure of human capital. The study suggests that the higher level of ethnic
fractionalization in society, the level of human capital decreases. This measure, ethnic
fractionalization, is based on the availability of education.
The addition of the human rights variables, whether secondary or primary, all contribute
to economic growth with statistical significance. Interestingly, the human capital variable renders
the constraints on the executive model insignificant regardless of geography variables, which

7

BenYishay, Ariel, and Roger R. Betancourt. "Civil liberties and economic development." Journal of Institutional
Economics 6, no. 3 (2010): 281.
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could potentially be influenced by an empowered electorate to increase economic viability.
When human capital and human rights variables along with institutional variables are added to a
predictive model, they enhance the explanatory power of the data, while the geographical
variables contribute to a lesser extent.8
The study suggests that the prevalence of the rule of law through civil liberties remains a
dominant predictor of economic development, regardless of correction for reverse causation.
They find a correlation between economic growth and the rule of law, without declaring
causation. The authors conclude that when secondary human rights exist, in addition to primary
rights, economic growth seems probable. As a country or group attains a higher level of
economic development, civil liberties have a larger impact on further growth.
While racial advance in the US does not parallel cultural advance in the Middle East, the
effect of policies on economic growth of certain parties can exemplify common trends in
different societies. In “Continuous versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on
the Economic Status of Blacks,” Donohue and Heckman explore the changes in the labor market
and social outcomes of blacks following the 1964 Civil Rights Act. They also acknowledge that
some changes could be delayed from 1954’s Brown v Board, or affected by 1962 and 1965
Voting Rights Acts.
The compilation of the authors’ research was less conclusive than we would hope,
suggesting they had difficulty empirically measuring the economic data of federal pressure for
equity. The systemic change following the passing of laws was slow, and generally resulted in
more laws without influential change felt by the people.9 While it is clear that there was legal and

8

Ibid.
Donohue III, John J., and James Heckman. Continuous versus episodic change: The impact of civil rights policy on
the economic status of blacks. No. w3894. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991.
9
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systemic growth toward racial equity, it was slow and full of setbacks. This may bare a relation
to the slow economic growth for blacks in the US, but this article conveys no conclusive
correlation or causation, which would not support the hypothesis that PSL reforms influence
economic growth.
2.2. Personal Status Law
Personal Status Law i.e. Islamic PSL, Shariah Law, Moudawana, Marriage and Family Law,
Personal Code, Civil Law, Social Contract Law
Personal Status Law can be defined as a set of privileges, obligations, powers, and
restrictions that a person has as declared by legislation. For the purpose of this paper, we use the
term Personal Status Law to regard all of the legislation that defines a person’s legal rights in all
Arab countries, understanding that the chosen indicators may be categorized under different
legislative sectors depending on how the law is written in a given country. So while the listed
terms do not have the same definitions, they may be interchanged for the sake of this paper.
Sharia law is not codified and therefore left to the interpretation of a nation-state, which leads to
the disparity between countries in PSL especially as defined for women.10 Ideally, a country that
has remained fairly stable throughout the refugee crisis with clear PSL reforms and possesses
GDP data both before and after the change in PSL would make the best possible case study.
2.2.1. Indicators: The following are some of the many possible indicators for Personal
Status Law. These were chosen because they tend to differ by gender and can be analyzed for
each case study as they are amended over time:

10

Charrad, Mounira M. 2011. "Gender in the Middle East: Islam, State, Agency." Annual Review of
Sociology 37, 417-37.
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(a)

Marriage

PSL regarding marriage can determine a person’s legal age to marry, the ability to choose
marriage (give oneself away), and the right to a dowry. It can also determine roles in a family,
often defining men as the family leaders, while women are caregivers and must be dutiful and
subservient. These roles can lead to men determining when and where his wife can go, if she can
be educated and what activities are appropriate.
(b)

Divorce (including Child Custody)

PSL regarding divorce can determine a spouse’s right to initiate divorce, to maintain child
custody, and to receive financial support following a divorce. PSL can also differ in valid
rationale for initiating a divorce, as well as legally obtaining a divorce, with the laws for men
tending to be quite simple and those for women more onerous.11
(c)

Legal status

Rights based on one's status, specifically the ability to vote and to hold office.
(d)

Mobility

PSL can restrict a person’s ability to travel domestically alone, to move to a new home alone, the
ability to drive, and the overall freedom of mobility. Managing restrictions on a woman’s
mobility may transfer from the father, or male guardian, to the husband – causing a woman to
require permission to travel for work, family duties, education or social interactions.
(e)

Citizenship

PSL can define and in many cases limits the ability to pass on citizenship to a spouse and/or
children. Therefore a child born and lived their whole life in a country may not be a citizen of
that country depending on the country’s PSL and the parent’s nationalities.

11

Islamic jurisprudence according to the four madhahib, vol. 4, The book of marriage and divorce, 2nd ed. (Beirut:
Dar Alkotob Alelmiyah, 2002), 56-9.
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(f)

Financial Rights

PSL can define disparate rights between genders and for women limit the right to get an
inheritance, to open a bank account, or even have access to a family’s money. These laws make
it common for women to make money in the informal market economy and hide the cash in their
homes, often from their husbands as well, for personal emergency funds.
(g)

Domestic Violence

The legality of violence or abuse of a family member on another is also defined by PSL. Legal
abuse of women is in many cases interwoven with guardianship rights, and laws which protect
women from violence are loosely enforced.12

3. Theoretical Framework
This thesis is working to define the relationship between personal status law and
economic growth in Arab countries. Originally, I hypothesized that a positive shift in gender
equity via personal status reform would influence a positive shift in a nation’s economy.
Specifically, I want to argue that this is occurring through one causal path based on my research:

12

Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, “Rethinking men’s authority over women: Qiwama, Wilaya and their underlying
assumptions,” in Gender and Equality in Muslim Family Law: Justice and Ethics in the Islamic Legal Tradition ed.
Lena Larsen, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Christian Moe, and Kari Vogt (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2013), 191-212.
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FIGURE 3.1 Theoretical Path from PSL Reform to Economic Growth
Personal Status Law
Reforms Support
Gender Equity

Increase in
Opportunity for the
Growth of Women’s
Liberties

Economic Growth of
Women

Progression of Social
Norms Empower
Women to Diversify
thier Finances

Expansion of
National Economic
Capacity

National Economic
Growth

As we investigate the competing variables and other possible paths, I explicitly outline my
theoretical claim that gender equity is the causal mechanism that causes personal status law
reform to generate economic growth with the following supporting evidence.
3.1. Effect of Policy on Gender Equity
Personal Status Law Reforms Support Gender Equity: Looking at the Personal Status
Law indicators outlined in Chapter 2.2.1, we can identify how a reform of each indicator would
affect gender equity. PSL indicators Marriage, Domestic Violence, and Legal Status do not
directly affect women’s economic opportunities, but they significantly affect the appropriate
representation and treatment of women according to the government. Women’s ability to be her
own guardian and have legal individuality tells society that she is capable of personal decisions
and independence. Mobility and Citizenship both can affect a women’s ability to be competitive

Bring 16
in the workforce, thus allowing them to have jobs outside the home and make a salary
independent from the family income. Finally, the most impactful indicators on women’s
economic growth is Divorce laws and Financial Rights. The ability for a women to maintain
child custody and receive financial support following a divorce allows for independence and
opportunities beyond remarriage following a divorce. The concept of the familial finance’s being
half or even partially belonging to the wife is a impactful and progressive step for women in
Arab countries who have bound by prior restricting PSL. This leads into financial rights,
anecdotal evidence supports that women often hand over all money made selling items in the
informal markets, or they hide stashes of money in their home for personal or emergency use.
Without financial rights, wives must ask their husbands, and daughters their fathers, for money
and the permission to use it on their desired transaction, often referenced as a gift and not right,
even if women are contributing to the household funds.
The role of women’s autonomy and the role of women in the family are integral in the
areas of marriage, divorce, and child custody. These cultural norms are often influenced by
political values and constitutional law.13 Aldosari at the The Gulf Arab States Institute published
a study in 2016 that claims Personal Status Laws that differ on the basis of sex are a major
hinderance in the full development of the region. The article exemplifies how vastly PSL varies
among countries. Yet similarly, there seems to be a systemic opposition to reform of PSL even
when new laws are formulated and passed, most likely the cultural and historic norms
overpowering a change in law. This initates the Cycle of Gender Inequity as seen in FIGURE:

13

Aldosari, Hala. The Personal Is Political: Gender Identity in the Personal Status Laws of the Gulf Arab States.
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 2016.

Bring 17
FIGURE 3.1.1 Cycle of Gender Inequity

Social Norms
Declare
Gender
Inequity

Personal
Status Law is
Defined on
the Basis of
Sex

Turning Islamic teachings into law revokes the freedom of religion for the individual.
While Islam by no means calls for the oppression of women, the patriarchal history of society
and family life overshadow the message of Muhammad’s word, which calls for equality of
people regardless of gender. Many practices exist with the purpose of protecting and revering
women, NOT to limit their rights. Aldosari conveys a correlation between Islamic rule of law
and gender inequity, but by no means a direct causation. It is in agreement across scholars that
study feminism in Islam that the religion of Islam, the words of the Quran, and the teachings of
Mohammad are not inherently sexist.1415 Yet the patriarchal norms in the Arab world also
correlate with gender inequity, thus providing a confounding variable that limits causal claim.
Aldosari concluded that without women in decision making positions in will be very
difficult to sustain meaningful change, economic or otherwise.16 Women hold the bigger burden
of the variation in PSL, because they are often the ones negatively affected. I argue that gender

14

Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. "Women, Islam, and the Moroccan state: The struggle over the personal status
law." The Middle East Journal 59, no. 3 (2005): 393-410.
15
Spierings, N., Smits, J. and Verloo, M., 2009. On the compatibility of Islam and gender equality. Social Indicators
Research, 90(3), pp.503-522.
16
Aldosari, Hala. The Personal Is Political: Gender Identity in the Personal Status Laws of the Gulf Arab States.
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 2016.
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relations and PSL undoubtedly affects the economic growth and development of the region.
Woman are half the population. Repression of both decision making and creativity of half the
population is contraindicated to growth of any type.
Increase in Opportunity for the Growth of Women’s Liberties: M. M. Charrad is the
leading expert on the relationship between PSL and gender in North Africa. As a Tunisian-born
multicultural and multilingual researcher of the Maghreb, M. M. Charrad has outlined a strong
identity of Maghreb women in PSL without painting the concept in black and white. Her 2012
report for the UN on Family Law Making address PSL in Tunisia and Morocco specifically as
well as PSL making as a whole. Her research concluded that “woman friendly" reforms are
important despite the process of initiation, even from top-down in the absence of feminist
pressures. She stresses the weight of positive PSL reform toward gender equity may not be about
the law itself, but about how “they generate a new climate in which the next set of debates will
take place.”17 Charrad supports my causal path that change in social norms cannot proceed the
expansion of opportunities and instead follows it.
3.2. Gender Equity and Economic Growth
Presently, there is little evidence supporting the theory that increased gender equality
under the law translates into more rapid economic growth. Yet the reversal causal, that economic
growth makes restrictions of women’s rights costly, has been used to explain the expansion of
women’s rights in the US.18 This competing argument that the causal path is working in reverse

17

Charrad, Mounira M. "Family law reforms in the Arab world: Tunisia and Morocco." New York (2012).
Geddes, Rick, and Dean Lueck. "The gains from self-ownership and the expansion of women's rights." American
Economic Review 92, no. 4 (2002): 1079-1092.
18
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is contradicted in Dollar and Gatti’s research that found no relation between GDPpc and
women’s rights on a cross cultural study of over 100 countries.19
Progression of Social Norms Empower Women to Diversify their Finances: If PSL
reforms alter our indicators to support gender equity, this opens many doors for women to join
the national economic system in the formal market. If women can be physically and financially
independent, this adds another participant to the economic market. Actions like getting a job and
earning money, spending money, opening a bank account, paying taxes, receiving inheritance,
divorce settlements or childcare payments, and earning interest all contribute to a country’s
economy and more participants give the capacity for further growth. The simple use of a dollar
makes a statement, and reforming PSL to allow for women to use that dollar gives them a voice.
Economic Growth of Women: A study of land rights on investment and productivity in a
small town in Ghana concludes that people with stronger political standing or influence would
have more secure land rights, and those with more secure land rights would put more into their
fields and yield better economic outcomes. Specifically they found that women’s rights to the
land was often contested and thus they invested less in land fertility and consequentially yielded
a lower economic profit. Policies that increase the gender equity of access to economic assets are
linked with an economic increase for women.20
Furthermore, mobility restrictions limit the supply of women’s labor participants and
societal norms limit the demand for female labor.21 While social norms can differ at the

19

Dollar, David, and Roberta Gatti. Gender inequality, income, and growth: are good times good for women?. Vol.
1. Washington, DC: Development Research Group, The World Bank, 1999.
20
Goldstein, Markus, and Christopher Udry. "The profits of power: Land rights and agricultural investment in
Ghana." Journal of political Economy 116, no. 6 (2008): 981-1022.
21
Morrison, A., Raju, D. and Sinha, N., 2007. Gender equality, poverty and economic growth. The World Bank.
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household level, law does not, which allows for the economic growth of a nation’s women as a
whole to increase overtime as norms progress.
Expansion of National Economic Capacity: In 2013 the World Bank published a paper
stating a main goal of theirs to promote shared prosperity and reduce poverty worldwide, stating
“improvement in [shared prosperity] requires growth to be inclusive.”22 It goes on to compare
economic opportunities and growth between countries and individuals based on demographics
and social exclusion - specifically stating that the social exclusion of women hinders a country’s
economic growth. Logically, we can conclude the contrapositive true as well. If the exclusion of
women from being active participants in the national economy hinders the country’s economic
growth, then including women as participants in the national economy expands the country’s
capacity for economic growth.
Alex Martin also spoke to this on her analysis of the relationship between gender
inequality in the education system in Morocco and economic growth. Her research indicates
references the two theoretical pathways of a positive correlation, structuralist and
modernization.23 Modernization implies that social norms drive society into a constantly
developing future that propels economic growth by the power of the people. The structuralist
thought aligns with the argument that laws, systems, and structures existing, such as PSL
reforms, can lead to opportunity for economic growth.24 My framework agrees with the
structuralist theory, claiming that the laws bring about the social norms and not vice versa.

22

The World Bank Annual Report 2013. World Bank Annual Report. The World Bank, 2013.
Martin, Jane Alexandra. "Women Empowerment Externalities of the 2004 Moroccan Moudawana Reform:
Intrafamily Bargaining and Educational Attainment." SMBHC Thesis, University of Mississippi, 2017.
24
Braunstein, Elissa. "The efficiency of gender equity in economic growth: Neoclassical and feminist
approaches." GEM-IWG Working Paper (2007): 07-4.
23
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National Economic Growth: According to a 2007 World Bank paper on equality and
economic growth, it is more difficult to convey the existence of this step than the prior ones,
“micro level effects of gender equality on individual productivity and human development
outcomes have been well documented and have important ramifications for aggregate economic
performance, establishing an empirical relationship between gender equality and poverty
reduction and growth at the macro level has proven to be more challenging.”25
In 2017 the United Nation’s Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
published a document of the overarching issue of inequality in the Arab region and the effect on
all seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, stating “Inequality adversely affects the economic
prosperity and stability of a nation, as increased levels of inequality threaten economic growth
and prevent its sustainability, and hinder serious attempts to reduce poverty.”26 It goes on the
argue that as well as hinder poverty reduction, inequalities obstruct civil society, solidarity,
social justice, human rights, democracy, and promote political unrest, petty crime, and longstanding conflicts. If inequality of the population is a national issue, it makes equity in the best
interest of all citizens.
Basic economic theory argues that growth occurs when the economy has the capacity to
produce more, often determined by capital, labor, natural resources, and technology it has
available to produce. In this case adding women as an economic resource would increase capital
and labor accessible to produce. And because PSL reforms encourage the addition of these
resources to the supply, these policies lead to economic growth. While confounding and
extraneous variables exist, many are proven to not affect this relationship conversely to the
framework. Ruling out competing theories would necessitate individualized research for each

25
26

Morrison, A., Raju, D. and Sinha, N., 2007. Gender equality, poverty and economic growth. The World Bank.
Nuru-River, Amani. "Inequality in the SDGs." United Nations, Beirut. 2016.
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theory, and while some exist as mentioned above, it is impossible to conclusively say that my
framework is true and all other theories are false without investigating every single one.

4. Methodology
In order to truly analyze the relationship between PSL and economic growth, I will use
independent case studies of significant change in PSL to investigate for a related change in
economic growth, using global GDPpc overtime as a control for “normal” GDPpc growth. My
investigation of gender equity as the causal mechanism toward growth lies in the case studies
and supplemental data. My thesis will rely on existing GDP data and country case studies on
PSL reforms in search of a correlation between economic growth and PSL.
It is important to address that accurate and up-to-date qualitative data on economic
growth across the Middle East is unavailable due to the refugee crisis and the recent focus on
women’s inclusion in the discussion of national economic growth. Many PSL reforms either
occurred near the inception of the country, before the range of reliable empirical economic data
was collected globally. On the contrary, other PSL reforms occurred so recently that there is not
good economic data following the reforms to examine for a resulting change in GDPpc.
Initially, I will select two cases of transformative PSL reform. Case studies were chosen
based on countries that had a significant change in PSL, in an attempt to investigate for a
significant change in economic growth. When looking at all Arab Middle Eastern countries that
have had been governed by a form of Islamic Law, there are many options. Tunisia and Morocco
both underwent substantial legislative reforms in PSL along with various amendments overtime,
so the change in indicators can be directly compared to a change in GDPpc.
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Quantitatively, I will then run an Unknown Structural Break test on Stata software on
each case individually to test for any statistically significant changes in growth. Then I will plug
in each year of PSL reform to a Known Structural Break test for specific possible triggers, as
well as 1 year, 3 years, and 5 years following the year of the reform. This will give a p-value,
from which we can estimate the probability that the given year was a statistically significant
break.27 If the probability that it happened by chance is low, then we can argue that it was indeed
a structural break and that it is possible the PSL affected this break. We would conclude that it is
possible that the hypothesis is true, without confirming the causality of the change in growth.
Qualitatively, I will then analyze the written PSL legislation and the country’s
implementation of this reform. I will be looking at how long it took for policies to be put in
place, government systems to shift, and individuals to see changes in their personal status. For
example, when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia gave women the right to drive a car, it took time to
train women to be driving instructors, and then for them to teach female civilians and to finally
have female drivers out on the roads. Therefore, if it took three years for a transformative PSL
reform to trickle down from legislation to the individual citizen, it may be three years following
the reform that there exists a structural break in economic growth.
4.1. Case Selection
4.1.1. Tunisia: The 1956 Tunisian Law of Personal Status was a significant change in
legislation for Tunisian personal status law. Since then there have been several amendments that
can be compared to Tunisian economic growth over the course of changing legislation, which
makes this is a good example of a large change in PSL as well as some smaller reforms that may
have also triggered a change in economic growth. Tunisia had reforms to their Code of Personal

27

Stata, 2020. “Tests for structural breaks in time-series data.” Stata.com.
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Status in 1962, 1964, and 1966 but there is little record of the specifics of these reforms, and
therefore they are insignificant to my research as they are not transformative PSL reforms.28 I
will specifically examine the PSL reforms in 1956, 1981, and 1993 and compare for significant
growth in GDPpc.
The 1956 reform “abolished and criminalized polygamy, banned extrajudicial divorce,
allowed women to file for divorce, gave men and women equal rights with respect to initiating
divorce and generally expanded women’s rights.”29 This reform was the most extensive of
Tunisia and affected largely the PSL indicators marriage and divorce. The 1981 reform largely
affected laws regarding divorce and expanded women’s rights to compensation following a
divorce. And finally the 1993 law affected a different indicator, it allowed for women to pass
citizenship on to their children regardless of the father’s nationality. Thus the GDPpc can be
analyzed for a statistically significant change in growth one, three, and five years following the
years of the reforms.
4.1.2. Morocco: Morocco employed their first PSL in 1957 under the Personal Status
Code following its decolonization. Then Morocco had legislative reforms in 1993 and then in
2004 Morocco underwent a significant PSL change entitled the Family Law Reforms. These
changes were employed to increase the rights of women in Morocco following a reinterpretation
of Mohammad’s teachings that elevated women.30 This is a clear instance of state defined PSL
reform for the purpose of gender equity, which allows the dependent variable, economic growth

28

Zeira, Yael. 2013. Memo on Test Cases. “Assessing the Impact of Family Law on Women and Girls in the Islamic
World.”
29
Zeira, Yael. 2013. Memo on Test Cases. “Assessing the Impact of Family Law on Women and Girls in the Islamic
World.”
30
“The Arab Human Development Report: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World.” Choice Reviews
Online 44, no. 12 (August 1, 2007): 44-6583-44–6583.
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to be evaluated for correlation. While their implementation in 1957 did not deviate from previous
norms, the 1993 and 2004 reforms can be examined for significant growth in GDPpc.
The 1993 reform affected PSL regarding marriage and divorce, but not substantially. This
reform altered the details surrounding a polygamy, guardianship, marriage, and divorce without
redefining the social contract of women. The 2004 Family Law Reforms “gave adult women the
right to self-guardianship (regardless of marital status), raised the legal age of marriage for
Moroccan women to 18 and gave both men and women the right to compose their own marriage
contracts.”31 Therefore the GDPpc can be analyzed for a statistically significant change in growth
one, three, and five years following the 1993 and 2004 reforms.

5. Data
While historic quantitative data is difficult to obtain for economic growth, the Penn
World Table32 has Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (in mil. 2011US$) for Morocco
back to 1950 and for Tunisia back to 1960, as seen in CHART 5.1. From this data, we can look
at the change in GDP overtime and find a structural break, if there is one present, but it is less
accurate than a true GDP gathered from an international source. Also, while the intention was to
use GDPpc data, there is only historic national GDP data available dating back to 1950, as
needed for Tunisia to analyze the 1956 reform. Because this is historical GDP data, I also have
pulled data from the World Bank33 as a more stable source of information, as seen in CHART
5.2. While this data set is more accurate, the GDPpc data from world Bank only goes back to

31

Zeira, Yael. 2013. Memo on Test Cases. “Assessing the Impact of Family Law on Women and Girls in the Islamic
World.”
32
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn World
Table" American Economic Review, 105(10), 3150-3182.
33
World Bank. “GDP per capita (current US$),” World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts
data files.
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1960 for Morocco and 1965 for Tunisia, which would eliminate the ability to analyze the 1956
PSL reform in Tunisia.
CHART 5.1 Real GDP (in mil. 2011US$) Penn World Table
Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (in mil. 2011US$)
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Morocco
16,709
16,920
17,744
18,609
19,040
17,776
18,121
17,432
19,438
19,952
20,400
24,529
28,232
32,720
34,403
34,291
33,034
34,538
36,827
40,530
42,393
44,123
45,854

Tunisia

8,542
8,800
8,944
9,923
10,304
10,696
11,027
11,011
11,949
12,463
16,243
17,865
21,035

Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

Morocco
47,497
50,148
53,938
59,766
63,381
64,805
67,916
70,786
68,827
75,448
75,028
78,276
83,225
89,970
87,735
96,983
99,390
103,250
110,425
105,973
104,900
115,766
108,149

Tunisia
20,899
22,582
24,196
26,107
26,995
28,736
30,622
32,891
34,707
34,540
36,156
38,228
40,392
39,584
41,526
42,200
43,661
46,750
48,575
52,367
53,512
55,215
56,512

Year
Morocco Tunisia
1996
121,362
60,553
1997
118,658
63,847
1998
127,765
67,016
1999
128,441
71,048
2000
130,487
74,103
2001
140,341
77,697
2002
144,995
79,017
2003
154,154
83,340
2004
161,556
88,306
2005
166,368
91,838
2006
179,278
97,031
2007
184,129 103,099
2008
195,036 107,697
2009
212,524 111,059
2010
220,957 114,346
2011
234,817 112,153
2012
240,213 116,528
2013
252,035 119,217
2014
262,146 122,074
2015
275,074 123,523
2016
284,093 124,775
2017
299,993 127,214
Penn World Table version 9.1
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CHART 5.2 GDP per capita World Bank
GDP per capita (current US$)
Year

Morocco

1960

Tunisia

GDP per capita (current US$)

World

Year

Morocco

Tunisia

World

164.801

451.74

1990

1206.01

1491.12

4285.24

1961

158.924

463.83

1991

1266.85

1551.38

4464.65

1962

181.183

489.55

1992

1299.42

1799.11

4668.24

1963

196.531

516.62

1993

1199.32

1660.88

4669.58

1964

201.262

554.55

1994

1326.94

1743.15

4939.83

1965

206.449

217.911

591.72

1995

1432.31

1975.9

5412.34

1966

196.315

224.295

628.74

1996

1561.13

2113.59

5453.31

1967

202.857

229.029

655.87

1997

1396.77

2208.21

5357.07

1968

212.751

250.694

693.9

1998

1472.39

2292.71

5272.63

1969

232.126

260.408

749.73

1999

1447.97

2386.59

5395.94

1970

246.016

284.22

803.95

2000

1334.94

2211.83

5498.33

1971

265.208

325.564

870.44

2001

1339.29

2253.04

5396.89

1972

302.564

422.856

984.53

2002

1416.49

2344.41

5533.43

1973

364.636

504.828

1178.09

2003

1725.46

2760.41

6131.22

1974

439.012

641.105

1332.8

2004

1952.9

3111.38

6820.62

1975

502.757

765.189

1457.15

2005

2018.03

3193.21

7297.15

1976

524.179

779.045

1556.82

2006

2196.01

3370.03

7811.94

1977

590.232

863.067

1729.53

2007

2499.26

3775.75

8694.9

1978

690.171

984.801

2005.11

2008

2890.36

4307.16

9423.76

1979

809.628

1157.38

2288.67

2009

2866.92

4128.46

8830.31

1980

1078.84

1371.84

2532.76

2010

2839.93

4141.98

9551.34

1981

861.798

1286.55

2576.69

2011

3046.95

4264.67

10488.33

1982

836.436

1206.64

2507.32

2012

2912.66

4152.68

10605.21

1983

750.022

1203.66

2513.13

2013

3121.68

4222.7

10781.86

1984

668.385

1156.91

2561

2014

3171.7

4305.47

10952.34

1985

660.947

1147.43

2643.76

2015

2875.26

3861.69

10246.51

1986

840.011

1199.56

3069.91

2016

2897.66

3698.06

10281.91

1987

920.592

1259.14

3431.58

2017

3036.17

3482.19

10817.48

1988

1066.33

1281.2

3772.4

2018

3237.88

3447.51

11374.85

1989

1071.18

1253.33

3870.41

World Bank national accounts data
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6. Data Analysis
6.1. Stata Results
An Unknown Structural Break test conveys an unnatural break in the trend of data. The
data analysis program I used, Stata, is programmed to calculate an unknown structural break for
the user. After downloading the desired data, we used the ‘regress’ command to take a linear
regression of the data:
Regress [data name], vce(robust)
Or using the World Bank data set we compare it to the global average GDPpc to get a linear
regression that conveys an abnormal break from the economic growth.
Regress [data name] [world data], vce(robust)
This takes all the data points and places a “line of best fit” along the graph and tells the user how
strongly the data stays close to that line. Then we test for an unknown structural break, which
looks at the data as a whole and finds a break from the trend. We start by setting the unit of time
as a year with ‘tsset’ and the running the unknown break test with ‘estat.’
Tsset year
Estat sbsingle
The Unknown Structural Break test tells us the probability that the Null Hypothesis (H0) is true,
meaning the probability that there is no structural break in the data. Running this test gets us
results as seen in CHART 6.1.1-6.1.4. Test for a structural break tells us if it is known or
unknown. Number of obs. Tells us how many data points we are analyzing, with the full sample
conveying which entries those are. The trimmed sample removes outliers from the ends of the
data points. The estimated break date tells us Stata’s calculated data of structural break. And
finally the p-value is the probability of observing a break in the data if the Null Hypothesis is
true (there is no break). Therefore when the p-value is small, for example less than 0.05 (95%
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significance level), it suggests that the observed data is sufficiently inconsistent with the null
hypothesis and that the null hypothesis may be rejected. So in the case of our research – we infer
that this year may be a possible break in the data.
First, we look for an unknown break in Tunisia using our data from the Penn World
Table. Looking at CHART 6.1.1 we see that the p-value is 0.0000 for an estimated break date of
2007, telling us it is extremely possible there is a break in the Tunisian GDP in 2007. Now these
breaks are not always clear, with the 2007 date marked on GRAPH 6.1.1. While 1993 is still
considered the largest reform in PSL in Tunisian history, the Chambers of Deputies adopted two
projects that strengthened support for mother’s caring for children and raised the minimum
marriage age to 18 for both sexes. Logically, it seems unlikely that this would cause an
immediate break in the data trend, so I conclude that this break is likely not connected to PSL
reform.
CHART 6.1.1 Tunisia, Penn World Table, Unknown Break Date
Test for a structural break:

Unknown break date

Number of obs =

58

Full sample:

11

Trimmed sample:

20 - 60

Estimated break date:

2007

Ho:

No structural break

Test

Statistic

p-value

swald

307.7198

0.0000

- 68
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GRAPH 6.1.1 Tunisia, Penn World Table, Unknown Break Date

When we run the Unknown Break Test for Morocco, we again get a p-value of 0.0000 for
an estimated break date of 2007, telling us it is extremely possible there is a break in the
Morocco GDP in 2007 as well as seen in CHART 6.1.2 and the date marked on GRAPH 6.1.2.
This is interesting as it is three years following the major PSL reforms of 2004 that meant to
modernize women’s roles in Moroccan law while remaining aligned with Islamic teachings,
“The reforms attempted to reconcile the existing Mudawana with international standards of
human rights, adhering to Islamic tenets of justice and reason while remaining receptive to the
requirements of progress and modernity.”34 Thus any implementation of the reforms that
disseminated over those three years could have contributed to a break in the trend of GDP
growth in Morocco.

34

Charrad, Mounira M. "Family law reforms in the Arab world: Tunisia and Morocco." New York (2012).
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CHART 6.1.2 Morocco, Penn World Table, Unknown Break Date
Test for a structural break:

Unknown break date

Number of obs =

58

Full sample:

1

Trimmed sample:

12 – 58

Estimated break date:

2007

Ho:

No structural break

Test

Statistic

p-value

swald

188.0611

0.0000

- 68

GRAPH 6.1.2 Morocco, Penn World Table, Unknown Break Date

The historical GDP data has been estimated overtime, and thus appears to smooth the
growth curve substantially more that the actual GDPpc data we have available from the World
Bank. When we run the unknown structural break test for Tunisia’s GDPpc, we get a 0.0000 pvalue for a break at 1981. This was the year of the first major reform in Tunisian PSL since
1956, but it is unlikely that would cause an immediate break in the growth rate. Also, as seen in
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GRAPH 6.1.3, it appears as though there is a minor decrease in GDPpc before the growth
increases again, so the break detected could be a negative break, again for unknown reasons.
CHART 6.1.3 Tunisia, World Bank, Unknown Break Date
Test for a structural break:

Unknown break date

Number of obs =

54

Full sample:

6

Trimmed sample:

15 - 51

Estimated break date:

1981

Ho:

No structural break

Test

Statistic

p-value

swald

148.8993

0.0000

- 59

GRAPH 6.1.3 Tunisia, World Bank, Unknown Break Date

On the other hand, when we run the unknown structural break test for Morocco we get a
break date at 2007 again with a p-value of 0.0000. This p-value strongly infers the likelihood of a
significant break in the data. This aligns with the prior unknown structural break test run on the
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historical data in CHART 6.1.2 and the Mudawana reforms of 2004. Charrad’s research of this
conveyed a delay in implementation of the new laws by judges as well as a lack of awareness of
the reforms among the public, pointing to a possible reason for a lag in economic effect.
CHART 6.1.4 Morocco, World Bank, Unknown Break Date
Test for a structural break:

Unknown break date

Number of obs =

59

Full sample:

1

Trimmed sample:

10 - 51

Estimated break date:

2007

Ho:

No structural break

Test

Statistic

p-value

swald

21.1539

0.0000

- 59

GRAPH 6.1.4 Morocco, World Bank, Unknown Break Date
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6.2. Case Studies
6.2.1. Tunisia: To test the theory that PSL reforms affect economic growth enough for a
statistical significant break in the data, we run a known structural break test for the year of the
reform, one year later, three years later, and five years later. We do this following the ‘tsset’
command using:
Estat sbknown, break(target year)
The results, as seen in CHART 6.2.1, convey a p-value of 0.0000 in 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986,
1994, 1996, and 1998 at a 95% confidence level. First of all, this is extremely unlikely that there
are seven statistically significant breaks in a 54 variable data set. While one or two of these may
have some grounds, there is no mathematical explanation for all of these to be break dates.
That being said, it is possible that 1981 is a break date as seen in the unknown structural
break test in CHART 6.1.3. There could also possibly be break between 1993 and 1998, but the
data is too inconclusive to determine a break. GRAPH 6.2.1 conveys a stronger jump in GDPpc
in the mid 2000’s, but there is no reform in PSL there to analyze. Despite the lack of consistency
in the data, Charrad concludes that 1993 reform in family legislation has made small incidents of
positive change in women’s equity without making a truly significant change. It is possible that
the correlation between PSL reform and economic growth is not as strong as I hypothesized.
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CHART 6.2.1 Tunisia, World Bank, Known Break Date
Test for a structural break:
Number of obs =

Known break date

54

Sample:

1965 - 2018

Ho:

No structural break

Break date:

1981

1982

1984

1986

1993

1994

1996

1998

Chi2 =

148.8

112.99

86.91

38.39

4.55

8.26

22.52

20.34

Prob > Chi2 =

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.103

0.016

0.000

0.000

GRAPH 6.2.1 Tunisia, World Bank, Known Break Date

6.2.2. Morocco: When we run the known structural break test on the Moroccan PSL
reforms for the year of the reform, one year later, three years later, and five years later, he
results, as seen in CHART 6.2.2, convey a p-value of 0.0000 in 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2004,
2005, 2007, and 2009 at a 95% confidence level. This would make all eight tested years a
statistically significant break in the GDPpc growth overtime which would be a statistical
anomaly.
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Beyond the issues in the execution in known structural break test, Morocco’s PSL
reforms align with both unknown structural break tests. The 2004 reforms were the greatest
change in Morocco legislatively, but the observable affects were limited. Judges who had been
practicing using prior Shari’a law, may be reluctant to change to the modern teachings and rule
in favor of the reform. It is clear that if the state’s population doesn’t support a PSL reform, it is
much less likely to be impactful on the nation regardless of contents of the reform.
CHART 6.2.2 Morocco, World Bank, Known Break Date
Test for a structural break:
Number of obs =

Known break date

59

Sample:

1960 - 2018

Ho:

No structural break

Break date:

1993

1994

1996

1998

2004

2005

2007

2009

Chi2 =

28.91

24.50

22.54

22.91

24.45

18.83

21.15

12.34

Prob > Chi2 =

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.0001

0.000

0.002

GRAPH 6.2.2 Morocco, World Bank, Known Break Date
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7. Conclusion
Without the ability to analyze every country and case individually, I am not able to
determine an accurate causal relationship between personal status law and economic growth
without confounding variables. Most elements of gender inequity in a country, whether health,
education, or law affect one another and intertwine such that unravelling individual causal
relationships is impossible. Analysis of personal status law and economic growth is an attempt to
separate out just one correlation, but this limits the lengths to which I can draw conclusions.
Also, the cultural climate, or public opinion of the rights of women and personal status law of
women in a country might also be a confounding variable that affects this relationship.
Even comparing GDP growth graphs of countries with significant change in PSL against
countries without a significant change in PSL is not without limitations as we cannot produce a
controlled counterexample for a country case study. Therefore the true downfall of this thesis lies
in the inability to determine the truth of the past without an attempt to replicate it in the future.
The other major shortcoming of this thesis is data analysis anomalies in the known
structural break test. A deep dive search of Stata resources and statistical structural break
analysis was inconclusive of a solution to better compare GDPpc and PSL. If this research were
to be replicated a new method of data analytics is recommended, or a different statistical
program altogether.
Altogether, the qualitative evidence better supports a strong positive correlation between
personal status law reforms and economic growth. The quantitative data shows some promise of
a correlation in Morocco but less of a relation in Tunisia. Overall, this compilation or research
does not disprove the hypothesis that progressive PSL reforms affects a growth in national GDP
via gender equity, but it certainly does not strongly support it. The greater presence of anecdotal
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evidence than mathematical proof is a major concern in any scientific argument. While this may
not be a causal relationship, the economic growth and gender equity and unarguable positive
developments for Arab societies and nations around the world.
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